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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MAXFIELD C. WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.
10064

vs.
ANNA SHAW WHTTEHEAD,
Defenoont-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF :THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce. Defendan!t ·counterclaimed seeking a divorce and alimony.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment for the Defendant Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower court judgment awarding to the Defendant the sum of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) as full settlement
of all property rights and alimony, and a judgment
in his favor awarding no property rights or alimony to the Defendant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 27, 1957, the second marri~age for each of
them. Defendant was 3'2 years of age a!t time of
marriage and 36 years at time of divorce. (R-86)
Plaintiff was 4'3 at time of divorce. (R-9'6) Plaintfff had children he was supporting by a former
m'arriage. (R-3'7) Defendant had no children by
either marriage.
The Plaintiff prior to the marri'age, was an
independent contractor and had accumulated several
parcels of real property, including various homes
and home conltracts and vacant property. In addition thereto the Plaintiff had various stocks and
stock interests in _corporations with which he was
involved both at the time of marriage and for a
period of time thereafter. All of Plaintiff's asse ts
were either those brought in to the marriage, or were
accumulated by the sale or transfer o'f assets accumulated prior to the marriage. (R-14, 15, 16, 17)
1

Prior to the marriage and during the marriage,
the Defendant was employed by the Salt Lake City
Board of Education as a school teacher and the
wages earned by her during the years of marriage
increased $'1800.00 by reason df her added experience 'and time in profession as ~a teacher. (R-91)
The Defen1dant's assets at the time oi marriage were
a 1'95'3 Mercury automobile and various personal
effects. During the m~arriage the 1953 Mercury was
1
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sold and Defendant given the use of Plaintiff's 1955
Mercury, which car the Plaintiff offered to give to
Defendant; All of Defendant's household effects and
personal i terns were returned to her and are now
in her possession. ( R-25, 26)
AU of the property owned by each of the parties was accumulated prior to the marriage of 'the
parties with the exception of some furniture i terns
and an accumulated equity in the home occupied by
the parties during the marriage, which home was
owned by the Plaintiff prior to the marriage. During the marriage 'there was accumulate'd approximately an equity of $1500.00 in this home, (R-27,
28) however, Plain tiff made all of the mortgage
payments upon said home.
During 1958 and 1959 Plaintiff ·continued in
the construction field and in addition t~aded and
sold several properties acquired pri·or to this marriage. During 1960 the Plaintiff was unable to continue in the contracting business and as a result
he became employed 'by the Utah Power and Light
Company earning approxi'mately the sum of
$3,600.00 per year. Plaintiff has attempted to maintain the contracts and real property accumulated
by him prior to the marriage and to satisfy the
obligations tha:t were incurred by h'im prior to and
during the marriage for said properly con tracts,
(R-19, 20, 21) and other living expenses. (R-24,
25) Further that Plaintiff has been and is obligated
to support his children by a previous marriage. (R37)
3
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As to the Defendant, here earnings increased
yearly and she earned, at the time of thi!s action, in
excess of $5,000.00 per year. Further that she left
the marriage with no obligations, and her financial
condi'tion was better than it was when she entered
the marriage, by reason of accumulated savings
(R-80). Defendant admitted that she gave up nothing but an unmarried status by her marriage to the
Plaintiff. (R-95)
At the time of the m~arriage the parties agreed
to maintain separate bank ~accounts and to maintain the'ir own funds and incomes ( R-22, 79). Plaintiff was to maintain house payments and maintenance, and pay for automobile, upkeep and operation.
Defendant was to pay home utilities and purchase
of groceries. ( R-23)
The parties maintained their separate lives 'during the marriage, taking separa:te trips, maintaining separate professional and social interests, and
apparently living in two sepaDate worlds. The fact
that they were unable to live happily together was
indicated by the testimony of bdth partie·s that the
marriage was a business like arrangement from its
beginning, :and by the fact that divorce was contemplated by the parties in 1969. (R-83) As a result the parties separated and this action was commenced.
At time of trial it was agreed the Defendant
could establish grounds and be awarded the divorce
4
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without opposition from Plaintiff but without prejudice to the property rights of the Plaintiff.
Based upon the facts and evidence the trial
court determined that the Defendant was entitled
to the sum of Ten Thousan1d Dollars ($10,000.00)
as aJim'ony 'and property settlement, and entered its
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree. Plaintiff moved for a new trial which
motion was denied, Plain tiff aJppeals.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE'D IN ENTERING I'TS
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AN'D IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NE'W 'TRIAL.

At the triai of this case, Plaintiff introduced
his financial statement of December 31, 1'95'7 ~and
of December 31, 1961 for the purpose of showing
that his financial condition has been considerably
reduced during the four years of marriage. Defendant attempted to show that Plaintiff wa:s misrepresenting his asse'ts to the court by rea'son of
the fact that he failed to list 28,000 shares of King
Oil Stock on his 1961 statement. Defendant further
argued that this failure indicated an attempt by
the Plain tiff to mislead and con'fuse the court. When
the trial court entered its Supplemental Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law it became apparent
tha:t the court was confused, however the confusion
resulted from the Defendant's illogical arguments
and not from t:he facts.
·
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Plain tiff testified that most of the King Oil
Stock was purchased in the early part of 1962, the
time when the parties separated and th'is action
was commenced. ( R-1'2) He further testified that
the 'purchase of this stock was made from fun'ds
received from the sale of assets 'previously accumulated. It was thereafter determined ~and presented
to Defendant that Plaintiff owned 30,000 shares of
stock in King Oil Con1pany, 28,000 shares having
been purchased after the preparation of iPJaintiff's
financial statement of December 31, 1'962, and having been purchased by the sale of propertie's set
forth in that 'financial statement.
The trial court therefore erred in fact in entering its Supp'lemental Findings of Fact, and erred
in not granting Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO
THE DEFE'ND.A!NT AS ALIMONY AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT THE SUM OF $'10,000.00.

At the beginning of the trial in this action,
the parties !agreed that for the purpose of the divorce Defendant shoul d establish the grounds without prejudice as to property rights. (R-1, 2) By
reason of this the element of faun should not be considered in determining distribution, if any. This,
together with the fact that the parties were married
only 4 years, and were without children, places the
elements to be considered well within the general
formula se't forth by this court in the case of Pinion
1
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Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 65 P2d 265. See also Mac
DO'Ylald vs. Mac Donald, Utah 1951, 236 P2d 1066.
t•s.

By its ruling in the Pinion case, the court 'Set
out the foHowing elements to be considered in determining the necessity of property settlement, which
elements Appellant daims should have been considered 'by the trial court :
( 1) The amount and kind of property owned
by each of the parties;
(2) Whether the property was accumulated
before coverture or accumulated join'tly;
(3) 'The ability and opportunity of each to
earn money;
( 4) The financial condition and necessities of
each party;
( 5)

The health of the parties;

( 6)

The standard of living of the parties;

( 7)

Duration of marriage ;

(8) What, if anything, did parties give up
by marriage ;
(9)

Age a:t which parties were married.

Reviewing the facts and testimony presen'ted
herein it would appear that this case falls directly
in line with the ruling in the case of Pinion vs. Pinion
(supra) which case has been referred to by the
Supreme Court on many occasions. The facts of
7
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the two cases ·are similar in that the marriage was
of relatively short duration; the parties terminated
the marriage under similar circumstances; the main
difference !being the fact that in the present case
the Defendant was employed and had her independent income prior to, during and after the marriage. The Supreme Court in the Pinion case stated
as follows:
"That the fact that she (the 'Defendant,
wife and counterclaimant) was married four
years should ordinarily en ti tie her to a substantial share of his property if the interruption of her former career by marriage left
her rna terially worse off in opportuni ty as
compared to where she might have been had
it not been for the interrupti'on, or the opportunity or ability for readjustment had materially suffered. Otherwise, four years out of
one's life well supported with a return to
singleness cannot necessarily be counted as
a detriment. Of course, the ultimate of her
happiness or unhappiness during the interruption is purposely omitted in summarizing
this case.''
1

The Court further stated as follows:
"As a general rule, a young couple married a short time, who break up with no children, would call it a misadventure in matrimony and unles'S the wi'fe has suffered mm:e
than the ordinary wear and tear of matrimony or stands by the divorce to lose substantial material benefits in economic status
or loss of inheritance, no alimony ordinarily
will be given."
8
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From the facts of the present case, it would
appear that all of the property, presently owned by
the Plaintiff was accumulated prior to his adventure into this marriage, either directly or by subsequent sale or trade. It would further appear 'that
the ability and opportunity to each of them for earning money has changed only to the advantage of
the Defendant in that she is earning more now than
she had been earning at the time or prior to the
marriage, while Plaintiff is now employed at a salary of $3,600.00 per year. Further, that the Defendant has at no time ceased to earn her money in
the same manner as she had prior to the marriage
and in fact has not in any way altered or ~hanged
her way of life. It would further seem that the financia;l condition and the necessities of the Defendant
remained approximately the same, while the Plaintiff was, and is required to support minor children
by his previous marriage, and pay an'd discharge
the obligation of the real property contracted for
which contracts are presently delinquent and in
jeopardy of loss, together with other expenses existing. The Defendant is only required to support and
maintain herself and is earning more money with
which to perform this task than she was prior to
or during the marriage. The Court should also consider that the Defendant gave up nothing by the
marriage and that the economic status was not altered by it. The evidence seems to point to the fact
that she is now 'better off economically than she was
prior to her marriage.
9
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The individual federal income tax returns of
the parties for the years 1'9'57, 19'58, 195'9, 1960 and
19 61 indicated that the Plaintiff had numerous business 'losses and business de ductions or depreciation
and other deductions, all of which showed as reduced earnings by the Plaintiff. 'The Defendant
placed great stress on the fact that she was earning
in excess of $4,000.00 for each of the years involved,
and that the Plaintiff's income was rar below th1s
figure. She further attempted to show that for this
reason the Court should presume that she was in
fact supporting the Plaintiff during those years.
However, a review of these matters shows that the
gross income of Plaintiff was considerably more
than the net income ultimately shown by this tax
return, and that much of the reduced income was
due to the carry-over losses from previous years
and to aepreciation and other nonpaid expenses that
were permitted for tax purposes. 'The true picture
indicates that the true spendable income of 'Plaintiff was considerably more than indicated by the
tax returns, and was in fact equal to and in excess
of income of the Defenldant.
1

1

1

!The Defendant had her own money and her
own bank account and used those funds exclusively
for her own use. The Plaintiff does not deny that
the Defendant purchased groceries for the home or
paid certain home bills, but equally did the Plaintiff
partic'ipate in the main ten a nee of the home and
the payment of bills, including the furnishings of
10
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gas and oil for the benefit of the Defendant's use
and pleasure.
The Defendant should not be permitted to participate in the assets that the Plaintiff brought into
the marriage nor should she now complain because
the Plaintiff was able to furnish certain tax deductions during the marriage which permitted the parties to obtain larger tax refunds than could have
been obtained had the Defendant filed 'her income
tax separately.
During the marriage the parties each enjoyed
good health with no medical prdblem's encountered,
and this condition continued during the approximate
7 months that the action was pending in the lower
court.
From the evidence presented to the court, it is
apparent that the parties herein leave this marriage
in substantially the same ·condition they were at the
time of the marriage, except for one fact and that
fact being that the Plaintiff is earning less money
than he was making at the time of the marriage
from the gross earnings standpoint, and that the
Defendant is in fact earning substantially more
than she was earning at the time of the marriage.
The Defendant has not materially altered her position nor has she suffered any material detriment or
change in her life as a result of the marriage, and
that therefore she should not he permitted to ·participate or demand from the Plaintiff alimony.
From all of the facts it is apparent that the
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant_ has not lost any material benefits in
economic status, loss of income, loss of inheritance,
a loss of any possible income by reason of the marriage. It is also apparent that Plaintiff has suffered
financial losses and is thus in a worse financial condition than he was when he embarked upon this
sea of matrimony.
The Court should also consider what, if any, rea!djustment is required as a re'sult of the marriage
and divorce. The facts plainly show that the parties
basicaHy did not change their pattern or standard
of living by the marriage nor was any readjustment
required by the divorce, in fact, the parties continued in exactly the same educational, social and
economic circles they enjoyed prior to marriage. The
Defendant continued to take her own trips, she continued her professional advancement and enjoyed
her same friends and associates.
The Plaintiff contends that the amount of the
award of alimony and manner of making property
settlement, if any, should be made only after complete consideration by the court of the condition,
situation, and standing of the parties, financially
and otherwise amount and value of estate of the
husband and the source from which it came and
how far the wife contributed thereto. See McKee
vs. McKee, 96 N W 489, Zimmerman vs. Zimmerman, 80 N W 643, Wandell vs. Wandell, (Mont.)
248 P. 864, Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 80 Ut. 9, 12 P2
364, Hampton vs. Hampton (N.M.) 4'7 P2 419.
12
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Appellant recognizes that no general rule can
be laid down as to how and when alimony should
be pai(i and property divided, and that each case
must be determined by its own facts. However,
where the trial courts determination appears to be
inequitable and unjust, as the facts herein indicate,
then this court should enter such decree as it finds
to be just and equitable, considering as stated in
the Hampton case (supra) :
"The amount of the award of alimony is
to be determined, not by the portion of the
husband's estate, but by the equities of the
case having due regard to the financial condition and necessities of the parties."

13
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CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court that the Defendant is entitled to an alimony and property settiement award of $10,000.00 completely disregards
the elements that should be considered under the
rul'ing in the Pinion case (supra) and seemingly
creates a penalty for unsuccessful marriage. It
would seem that to allow these parties to leave the
vessel of matrimony in the same social, educational
and economic condition as when they embarked
would be the just and equitable method of release.
Each party should leave as they came being enriched
only by the experience of an attempt to bridge two
educationally and socially different worlds by marriage.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER R. ELLETT
of
DANSIE, ELLETT & HAMMILL
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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